The Tragedy of the Internet

In the beginning of the Rheingold chapter, UCLA graduate and Microsoft research sociologist Marc Smith poses the question, “Does the new medium change the way people cooperate?” Even though Smith continues on saying that the answer to the question not an easy one, it seems to me that in accordance to the internet the answer is a resounding “yes”. While the early internet was intended to promote mass communication and groupthink via a connection infrastructure,  the transformation of the internet into a public good allowed users to deviate from the intended purpose.

As Shirky notes (re: the internet), “something is different [now]. It is easier for groups to form without social approval.” Through the internet, a good idea is no longer required for an individual to be heard by many. Virtually any idea can be perpetuated throughout the internet, even those that are not beneficial. One large reason that these groups gather momentum is the anonymity that the internet offers compared to a social situation. Another factor is the pure size of the internet. Like Shirky says “the ability for the like-minded to locate one another, and to assemble and cooperate with one another, now exists independently of social approval or disapproval.” With so many users it can be easier to find people who share your thoughts than it would be in the real world. These two factors, anonymity and size, combine to hurt groupthink and actually make people less cooperative. Cooperation requires the goal of the same ends by two parties, but when people have access to so many sites that support their ideas, they are likely to ignore those sites that contradict their ideas. Many times instead of cooperation and compromise, self-congratulatory discussions occur where the only “progress” made is through virtual pats on the back. Groupthink, genuine discussion, compromise, disagreement, and argument validity have all somewhat declined via the new mediums of communication as users search for validation instead of opposition.

However, it should be noted that the internet is not an entirely hopeless and many positive ideas do come along with the negative ones. Still, in response Smith’s notion about the medium, in this case the internet definitely changed the way people cooperate or do not cooperate. Luckily for us, the vastness of the internet helps to avoid a Tragedy of the Commons-esque situation where resources are wasted on non-altruistic ideas. Finally, as Smith explains the world wide web is just the next medium which allows for” more people pooling resources in new ways, [which is] the history of civilization in seven words.”

Shirky reiterates a lesson that most of us have been repetitively taught since as early as we can remember: do unto others as you would want done to you. Our parents called it “the golden rule,” but Shirky refers to it as the “shadow of the future” at work: “if you do someone a favor today, that person will do you a favor tomorrow” (Shirky, 192). Simply put, the shadow of the future refers to cooperation, and Shirky discusses the importance and necessity of cooperation and reciprocity for a group’s well being.
Shirky measures habits of cooperation in terms of social capital. I was not surprised by his claim that members of groups with more social capital are considered better off than those in groups with less social capital, as are societies with larger social capital compared to those with lesser social capital. (Shirky, 192). Shirky’s data supports what can be observed in the real world on a daily basis: people are better off when they work together for mutual benefit. According to Shirky, the driving force behind both the creation and sustainment of social capital is participation in group activities.
The Internet has greatly increased one’s ability to take place in such group activities that Shirky speaks of. Rheingold discusses the Internet as a platform for bringing like-minded persons together and facilitating new means of organizing collective action. That being said, one could assume that Internet users have a higher social capital than non-Internet users because they employ habits of cooperation within their Web-based groups. How do the Internet and social capital relate to one another? Does cooperation on the Internet increase social capital?

The Internet: Bringing Together New Communities of People

The emergence of new communication technologies, including the mobile phone and the Internet, has greatly influenced the way people interact in day-to-day life. Endless information is now available at peoples’ fingertips, with search engines like Google allowing people to sift through tons of information on tons of different topics. As society adapts to these new technologies, skeptics question whether these technological advancements are resulting in a decrease in community and social capital. Although it has been speculated that the rise of the Internet might be linked with a decrease in community and face-to-face interaction, the Internet actually provides users with a tool to unify into groups based on common interests and locations.

The Internet’s ability to create community groups is emphasized in Chapter 8 of Shirky’s Here Comes Everybody. This chapter, titled ‘Solving Social Dilemmas,’ talks about the role that the Internet plays in creating groups and activating communities through interactions online. With blogs and websites like Meetup, the Internet enables users to search for people that share similarities with themselves. Not only does the internet provide people with tools to unite with people who have their similar interests, but groups can be formed based on geographical location which allows people to actually meet up in person, not just online. Thus, the Internet provides people with a way to join groups, which can transform into communities of people meeting face to face.

Complementing the information from Here Comes Everybody, Rheingold’s Smart Mobs takes a positive stand on the Internet and argues that the Internet lowers the cost of solving collective action dilemmas and allows people to share resources in new ways. Technologies allow people to cooperate with each other in order to find a balance of self-interest and public goods.

Thus, the Internet seems to bring a lot of new opportunities for people with similar interests to meet and share ideas in ways that were not possible in the past. Problems arise, however, when these groups are harmful to society like terrorist groups or groups supporting eating disorders. These groups prompt questions like: Should negative self-help websites or dangerous terrorist groups be censored online? If so, how? Do the benefits of the new possibilities to unify groups online outweigh the dangers?

Caroline Cullen

Selfish or Supportive?

Nature says as humans we have a tendency toward our own self-interests considering that we are rational beings.  This is according to political philosopher Thomas Hobbes as described by Rheingold in Chapter 2: Technologies of Cooperation.  When it comes to the Internet and social networks, users are looking out for themselves, unless there is a higher authority or some benefit to the user themselves for what they are doing.

Keeping what Rheingold describes in mind, Clay Shirky’s Here Comes Everybody Chapter 1: It Takes a Village to Find a Phone seems highly unusual.  After gaining an immense amount of followers on Evan’s website, Internet users start to take action against Sasha.  This could be an example of collective action as Rheingold explains, yet many times in regards to collective action, people are willing to take but not give.  This is the opposite of what happened in Shirky’s Chapter 1; followers worked together to take down Sasha and get back Ivanna’s phone, but there did not seem to be anything in it for them.

Perhaps the thought of social justice being prevailed or a sense of community was enough for the large amount of followers to cooperate.  Maybe followers saw Evan as a figure of authority fighting for social justice and felt compelled to help him like the chapter suggests.  Either way, the unusually large number of followers that helped Ivanna get her phone back, and the extreme measures went through just for a cell phone is odd when comparing it to Rheingold’s reading.

Looking at these readings as examples, it might be interesting to look at how much self-interest plays a factor when working toward a greater goal such as social justice, and especially when collective action is as easy and fast as writing something on the Internet.

The Internet: An Atypical Common Good

John Barlow commented in his “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” that the internet is a place that should be unregulated by the government and recognized as an entirely free domain. He references a future where “anyone, anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being coerced into silence or conformity” and government “concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, and context do not apply”.

I agree with his idea that the internet presents individuals with unprecedented opportunities for individual expression, and that it can connect people and places at an unprecedented speed. However, as Rheingold points out in Chapter 2 of “Smart Mobs”, allowing complete freedom of a commons—a resource available to (in this case, almost) everybody—could ultimately result in our abuse of that commons. In other words, allowing humans to freely graze over a common product usually results in the misappropriation of the good. The eventual deterioration of the product exemplifies the concept of Tragedy of the Commons. Rheingold further details the inefficiency of human cooperation with examples of strategy games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where two individuals struggle to reach mutual benefit without being able to communicate their choices properly.

But does this inefficiency apply to the internet? In my opinion, the internet enhances our ability to communicate with each other, near and far, to foster new ideas and cultures. It is a boundless frontier unlike another common good like grass in a cow pasture. Rather than fear a human misuse of the internet, we should focus on how we can best manipulate its potential to serve the global community.

Like Rheingold, I am wary of the “every man for himself” mentality that Barlow suggests the Internet could sustain. Instead, I view it as an opportunity for every man to collaborate with every other man and advance the capabilities of international cooperation.

Is the common good that is the internet safe in our hands?

 

 

 

 

Media Evolution

The creation of the Internet seems to be evolutionary from the pre-existing media and society as opposed to a revolutionary creation. This idea is similar to the argument made by Barlow which suggests cyberspace is like nature and it grows itself through our collective action, except it assumes that the formation the medium itself was natural. Thus, consider the claim that the Internet was simply the available solution to the societal consequences of the media landscape prior to their creation as opposed to a medium that revolutionized our society based on its own properties.

 

Turner begins his assessment of hacker culture by citing Stewart Brand who argued that personal computing and the Internet were revolutionary creations that had grown directly out of the counterculture that existed at the time. Turner critics Brand’s analysis arguing that the claim that counterculture gave rise to personal computing was too specific. To Turner, it was not simply counterculture that gave rise to the Internet but also everything from the Defense Department’s desire to create the Internet to the corporations and the services they offered (i.e. AOL). While Turner considers the various actors and influences involved in the creation of the Internet, he does not consider the existing media landscape.

 

Shirky highlights the importance of social interaction and even claims that our social life is literally primal. Later in his novel, Shirky references Putnam’s article “Bowling Alone.” The article explains that due to broadcast media (specifically television), social capital (habits of cooperation) was in decline. Putnam argues that television lead to the privatization of leisure time and, as a result, people were no longer spending their leisure time socializing. Shirky also explains that prior to the creation of the personal computer and the Internet, communication existed in two forms: personal communication one-to one or broadcast media one-to-many. The Internet, then, offered consumers not only more freedom to choose their own content, but also a platform to voice their own opinions and to interact directly with other consumers- making the experience feel more social and the users feel more connected to one another.

 

Analyzing the creation of the Internet in this way begs a number of questions. First, does it seem acceptable to make the claim that the Internet was evolutionary rather than revolutionary? Additionally, is it valid to consider the formation of social media as merely the continued evolution of our media?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Shadow of the Future: Computers changing the way we live

Based on Shirky’s and Rheingold’s interpretations of social cooperation in today’s environment, I cannot help but be convinced that our strives and means subconsciously loop through the ideas of social construction of technology [SCOT] and technological determinism, but lean toward the latter. 

Today’s understanding of what it means to be social and collaborate in group settings is fairly altered to what it meant years ago.  Shirky argues that there is a decline in our need for and ability to obtain social capital due to the “increase in transaction costs” (Shirky 193).  People prefer an ‘easier’ method of communicating.  Scott Heiferman brings up a striking point, stating that “treating the internet as…[a] sort of separate space…was part of the problem” (Shirky 194).  There is a growing disassociation of cyberspace from real world; “of social from real space” (Shirky 194). 

This describes the idea of ‘technological determinism”, wherein technology essentially manufactures how society is run.  David Reed describes that collaborations and transactions that typically occurred outside the Internet “became absorbed into the growth of the Internet’s functions” (Rheingold 61).  This is understood further in the founding of Meetup, with which people use the Internet to find others with similar interests.

Today’s individuals and societies are very smart.  We are able to do, create, and develop the unthinkable.  I think, however, that we tend to rely on technology to shape how we conduct ourselves.  The understanding of the reason and capital behind forming a group or network has evolved drastically.  Whether it is for better or for worse, technology and computer-mediated forms of communication have truly changed our sense of what a community is.

Do you agree that there this understanding has evolved?  To what extent?

What might be some driving forces for or against this ‘change’? 

“The History of Civilization in 7 Words”

When I was 10 and a student at Barnard Elementary School in a suburb not far from Ann Arbor, I was convinced that I could write enough letters to Rupert Grint that he would personally receive them and be able to write back to me. Perhaps it is a parent’s love that holds back the information that any letter sent to an actor in Harry Potter is unlikely to be read by the intended recipient, but I was thoroughly upset when I discovered the reality of just how many people were writing to Rupert. In the age of the mainstream Internet, this issue of collective voice and technological publishing power has certainly torn down barriers to entry on one-way communication—but has not made two-way communication between anybody in the world possible. Technology expands our capabilities to project our voices to the public, but being able to be seen in the masses of millions of users’ information requires a whole different skillset of determination and self-promotion.

The example I identified with in Shirky’s book Here Comes Everybody concerned Oprah Winfrey. “Whether Oprah wants to talk to each and every member of her audience is irrelevant: Oprah can’t talk to even a fraction of a percent of her audience, ever, because she is famous, which means she is the recipient of more attention than she can return in any medium” (Shirky 92).  Getting Oprah to read a personal message left on her website, or sent to her television studio, is just as meaningless as the letters I sent to Rupert Grint. And just like these, any individual’s blog is just as meaningless to the millions of people on the Internet looking for content. In a sense, aren’t we all Oprahs and Rupert Grints when faced with the sheer mass of content on the Internet? There’s far too much information, so we must form our own systems of organization and filtering to see the parts that we want. Just as we set certain rules in our e-mail clients to recognize items as junk mail, we choose which sites we visit every day. We almost handpick stories to read from the already-reduced number of news sites we’ve chosen. Who can say that they log on to The New York Times’ website and read every story available today—let alone every story in one category! If I’m Oprah, I read the letters that I want and have the time to read. If I’m a student at the University of Michigan, I read a couple stories that are applicable to me and do not interfere with the completion of my schoolwork.

That’s what is perhaps so interesting about the first anecdote in Shirky’s book concerning the lost Sidekick. If the same problem had been written about in today’s Blogosphere, literally no one would notice or care. In Rheingold’s “Smart Mobs” article, Microsoft employee Marc Smith seems much more optimistic about the Internet’s power. “Whenever a communication medium lowers the costs of solving collective action dilemmas, it becomes possible for more people to pool resources. And ‘more people pooling resources in new ways’ is the history of civilization in..” Pause. “…seven words” (Rheingold 31).  Albeit dramatic, Smith could’ve made a significant point when using the Sidekick story as an example. Twenty years ago, a complaining well-off man couldn’t have caused a fuss with the NYPD over a stolen piece of $300 property—especially because the item in question was left in a cab. And yet Evan managed to muster the power of collective action when news outlets got involved and thousands of people were watching the story develop. But this mentality—Marc from Microsoft’s mentality—completely falls flat today. It’s true that Zach Braff (popular movie and television actor) was able to crowd-source funding for a sequel to Garden State on the crowd funding website KickStarter, but he was able to harness his fame to garner the attraction of tens of thousands of donors. There are thousands of other projects on the site, proposed by talented industrial product designers and engineers and musicians, which have gone without funding. And there are millions of other stories, photos, videos, etc., that will go without notice on the web which are published daily.

Rheingold’s incorporation of Hardin’s controversial article called “The Tragedy of the Commons, “ aligns more with my personal beliefs on the Internet’s power (yet ubiquity). Hardin describes every man as part of a herd, encouraged to increase his herd but regardless of a lack of space to accommodate every man’s expansion. The most famous quote is that each pursues “his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons” (Rheingold 34). The Internet strays from the definition of the commons in a very basic way; it can be considered a public good, but in most places not a good that can be diminished through other people using it (excluding price of access, broadband limits in public cafes, etc.). In short, any single person’s account and contributions to Reddit do not make someone else incapable of posting and contributing to Reddit. This well explains the mentality behind the user-generated content of the Internet: if one man’s consumption of space on the web doesn’t interfere with anyone else’s, why not use it limitlessly? Twitter, Facebook, WordPress, Tumblr, Reddit, Youtube…it seems as if everyone has an account on every site possible.

Is this this necessarily a bad thing? As always, there are two sides, but I’m leaning toward the negative. Obviously expanding access to technological capabilities and publishing platforms provides the world more choice on whose voice to listen to (regardless of knowledge or credibility), but it also obscures some of the professional and reputable outlets of information.  It absolutely diminishes the power of a single voice, unless that single voice has something extremely important to say and a way to make that importance known to the world. Anybody can write a blog post; not everybody can write a blog post that millions of people will read—unless of course, you’re Oprah.

Works Cited

Rheingold, Howard. “Chapter 2.” Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution. 2002. Print.

Shirky, Clay. Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing without Organizations. New York: Penguin, 2008. Print.

 

Reduced Barriers to Social Capital

In “Solving Social Dilemmas” of Here Come Everybody, Shirky focuses on social capital, which he defines as habits of cooperation. When the U.S. was experiencing declining social capital, Heiferman noted “people would take steps to increase their communal participation if someone could make it easy again” (Shirky 194). The Internet did just this by removing barriers such as social approval or disapproval and allowing people a place to gather together.

Rheingold reiterates this idea in Technologies of Cooperation where Smith notes “whenever a communication medium lowers the cost of solving collective action dilemmas, it becomes possible for more people to pool resources” (Rheingold 31). The Internet makes it easy for people to find others who share the same interests allowing for more people to gather and exchange information. Rheingold emphasizes another of Smith’s remarks where he says the reason people continue to share information on virtual communities is due to the fact that people can put in a little information and take out more information than they put in.  Due to this, Shirky points out that the people most engaged and motivated can create a place where the less motivated people can participate without becoming activists resulting in a mutual gain. However, this can allow both good and bad groups to form and exchange information.

While the allowance of groups to form more easily on the Internet fosters communication between individuals that otherwise may not have found each other or felt comfortable enough to express their ideas or concerns in other mediums, does the advantages associated with this ease outweigh the negatives? Also, should forums that constitute social disapproval in the real world be banned or shut down on the Internet like the Pro-Ana conversation was shut down on YM’s page? Or should these groups be allowed to converse online due to their rights of free speech? In addition, could these groups that gather around topics of social disapproval in the real world be used as a way to speak to this group as a whole against the topic or ways to provide help? Couldn’t it be true that people who would like to help these Pro-Ana girls post in the conversations as well and the result be that they reach a large number of people affected at once?

There are many ways to look at these groups and the way in which you view them will determine if you find them as positive or negative outlets.

Are There Problems with Free Collective Action?

“Your corn is ripe today, mine will be so tomorrow. ‘Tis profitable for us both, that I shou’d labour with you to-day and that you should aid me tomorrow.” (David Hume/Reingold 29)

In the increasingly interconnected and global Internet age, we have found that it is easier to form collectively in a “tit for tat” mindset where cooperation is the most mutually beneficial option. The groupings that Hume were able to envision, small, limited partnerships between farmers to achieve mutual profit have blossomed exponentially.  Marc A. Smith, now-research sociologist at Microsoft, told Rheingold that whenever a communication medium lowers the cost of solving collective action dilemma, it becomes possible for more people to pull resources” (Rheingold 31).

So we have established that the Internet age has increased the possibility for collective action. Clay Shirky is of this mindset as well, elucidating that the prisoner’s dilemma, where two actors could choose to cooperate or not, is highly relevant here. With the internet’s lowered transaction cost (the cost of an Internet connection, essentially), it is easier for groups to collectively form and act (Shirky 211).

However, the big question becomes, what are the ramifications of this almost completely free collective action? When Barlow from the Grateful Dead wrote his Declaration of Independence in cyberspace, he envisioned an unregulated space to act, think, and develop, and would almost certainly argue for fully free collective action. Shirky, however, believes there are problems inherent in unrestricted collective action, including mass amateurization of content,  damaging social bargains, and the resilience of networked organizations like terrorist groups. Personally, I fall somewhere in between. While it is the job of the Department of Homeland Security and other government organizations to track down and stop illegal activity that would be a serious threat to our security, this power should be used sparingly. Freedom of thought is a powerful thing, and I believe in the importance of allowing like-minded people to combine resources and form groups, a feat made much easier by the Internet.

And so, I pose the question to you:

Would you agree with Barlow, that an unrestricted free space for collective action is important, or Shirky, that problems can occur and society will have to actively decide which groups to oppose? Or are you in the middle? Why?

Implications of “The Shadow of the Future”

There is an undoubted connection between forward thinking and technology. A less obvious relationship, however, is that between these two concepts and human relationships. According to Robert Axelrod, “the shadow of the future” is the notion that people help others with the expectation that the other person reciprocate the favor in the future (Shirky 190). This theory is explanatory of general human communicative tendencies as well as the initial intentions of Internet hackers.

Shirky discusses the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In this game, players must choose one of a series of options that benefit them, benefit another player, or harm both players. The text suggests that this dilemma is best solved with the Tit-for-Tat strategy by which one player cooperates, trusting that the other player will cooperate next time  (Shirky 190). Just as the shadow of the future suggests, the Tit-for-Tat strategy relies on future behavior and reward. Shirky claims that this behavior is indicative of the human affinity to communicate through their decision-making.

The shadow of the future concept can also be applied to the initial creation of the Internet. In recounting the history of the creation of the Internet, Rheingold explains the “hacker ethic” that was followed by the original hackers of the 1970’s. Rheingold says that the hackers “knew that some community of hackers in the future would know more about networks than the original creators, so the designers of the Internet took care to avoid technical obstacles for future innovation” (p.48). Regardless of the hard work they had to endure, the hackers made the best possible version of their products so that others could use it to its best capacity in the future. In laying down a solid foundation for future hackers, the original hackers considered their own self-interest, as facilitating the innovation of future hackers would allow the original hackers to benefit from new innovations. This complies with the notion of “the shadow of the future” in that the original hackers acted in a way that would allow them to seek some sort of reward. The original hackers trusted that future hackers would use the original hacker’s technology to benefit the public.

The shadow of the future is just one of the many social tools which humans utilize to communicate with one another. It is interesting that such communication methods are considered when developing technology that is aimed to make communication easier for others.

An example check-plus post

The early history of computers and the Internet seemed almost predestined to shake up the political landscape.  In comparing Turner’s assessment of hacker culture to what Shirky identifies as the core capabilities offered by new media, we can see a streak of the counterculture at the very essence of the new media environment.  Whether this was on purpose or a fluke of history, the very foundations of the Internet made it the perfect tool for overturning the social order.

The seed of online rebellion can perhaps best be seen in the hacker ethic itself.  Two of the six values which Turner references (citing Levy) fundamentally challenge the traditional social order, namely that all information should be free and that authority should not be trusted.  He traces these ideas from the 1960s counterculture to the figures who were central to modern computing.  With this backdrop, it is perhaps unsurprising that the tools that these individuals designed were fundamentally decentralizing.

In assessing the state of new media, Shirky reveals the radical changes enabled by social Internet tools.  While these tools may seem to share few outward features with the precursors designed by Turner’s hackers, the principles of how they change the communication environment could scarcely be more similar.  Specifically, the societal shift from media published by select gatekeepers to a “publish then filter” approach is a story of tools designed to promote free information and to distrust authority.

Juxtaposing both Shirky and Turner, we see the clear echo of the hacker ethic in modern social media.  That ethic enables ordinary individuals to spread information in ways that were previously reserved for a select few.  In both Shirky’s examples and in more recent developments like the Arab Spring, those capabilities have demonstrated the capacity for radical social change.  One can only wonder if the hackers themselves imagined this possibility at the time.

Indeed, we may wonder what imprint can be seen of the designers versus the users in the adoption and affordances of online tools.

Digital Scaffolding

Howard writes that new information and communication technologies contributed a great deal to the Arab Spring. He also notes that there is a connection between the most developed countries involved on social media and how dramatic the protests were. In other words, use of social media allowed these countries to produce much stronger results.

This is why I believe that had it not been for social media, the Arab Spring would not have occurred. Or, it would have occurred, but wouldn’t have had nearly the splash that it did, and the results would’ve been far subdued. Howard harps on a “strategic minority,” also known as the 10-20 percent of Middle Eastern or North African civilians with Internet access. This demographic was crucial to this revolutionary time period. Without social media, this demographic would be significantly downsized.

In your opinion, what would the Arab Spring have looked like without the social media tactics?

Considering Cultural Difference in the Impact of Social Media Use

This class has begged the question of the usefulness of social media in social movements and revolutions. While it is apparent that the answer varies greatly depending upon whom and what is being moved upon, we tend to gauge social media’s usefulness based on the lens of the dominant political culture in the U.S. Such a view can lead to narrow thinking and engagement with analyzing the usefulness of social media for other cultures within and outside of the United States.

I have often argued the minority opinion that Twitter can indeed be and has been useful. For starters, it is not only useful in the Middle East and North Africa, but also across different cultures in the United States. What must be evaluated and pondered is the accessibility, reach and need for social media in different cultures and their movements. The tactical measures that Karpf argues do not necessarily lead to strategic action are not necessarily true. Oppressed groups in search and need of an avenue to share can surely find it by way of sharing information and ideas. This virtual space is, in fact, extremely useful for such groups, especially those who have the urgency but lack the spaces to meet and organize themselves regularly and/or publicly.

I would argue that while revolutionary movement can be called for through sharing pressing information online, the revolutions do not begin online. The impetus for revolution is rooted in situations that call for them—not talking online. The coverage, sharing and discussions that occur on social media have only revolutionized how these revolutions will form and navigate discussion. The sharing of ideas far and wide by way of the internet definitely has had a useful impact that reach beyond the tactical measures this class seems a bit hung up on. The use of social media allowed the Arab Spring to take shape in a new and innovative way that previous uprisings had not. Through social media, the people who were inclined to begin and participate in the revolution were able to provide information that pushed for movement on the streets. Tufeki and Wilson found that social media use increased the odds that a respondent attended protests (363).

 

Does the urgency of situations have an effect on how useful social media can be in social movements?

Has the Arab Spring reading changed your opinion or views of social media? If so, how?

Can you really call it a revolution?

As recently discussed in class their is and has been speculation as to whether or not the use of social media is successful in promoting certain messages and increasing involvement. When somebody retweets an important message, is it actually improving the situation or is it simply just relaying the message? Karpf would argue that when we use social media in this way we are not actually helping the situation, and our involvement is based around our own needs to feel better about ourselves. However, this is not completely true. Social media does in fact allow for aid in specific situations.

Social media has played a huge role in communication in the middle east and northern Africa. Howard discusses in his article “The Role of Digital Media,” how social media was able to allow for instantaneous and widely shared information (Howard). This information allowed followers to become more organized and learn about information from their peers in similar situations. This was the one form of communication that had not been censored by the government and because of this became a tool to all of those involved (Howard). Howard’s opinion was then challenged by Anderson as to whether or not social media was making as big of an impact as he thought. She argues that while social media is great, to call it a revolution would be incorrect (Anderson).

With the argument that social media has to capability to organize the masses, and the counter argument that its impact is only as strong as the civic engagement that follows it – which do you find to be true? Do you feel that social media can revolutionize how we communicate in challenging times?

Comparing Revolutions and Social Media’s Role

After last week’s discussion of readings that were more skeptical of social media’s role, I wanted to keep an open mind as to how I felt about social media use in revolutions. Morozov argues that Twitter makes people believe they are playing an important role, and Howard argues that social media are simply tools, which don’t quite qualify it as a digital revolution. This week we have seen the other side of the spectrum, particularly from the Egypt revolutions. Social media seems to be more useful in revolutions than many may initially think.

The Tahrir Square protests are a prime example. Tufekci and Wilson looked at a survey and found that social media was used effectively to spread new information and set up protests. The authors write, “Those who used blogs and Twitter for both general information and for communicating about the protests were more likely to attend on the first day” (375). Organization is obviously a critical part to any revolution. If people can understand a hierarchal structure within social media, organization can become even more powerful (similar to what Gladwell argues). Overall, the Egypt example seems to lend evidence that social media can play a key role in revolutions by bringing people together to communicate and organize.

However, I think you could still make the argument like Howard might, saying that this is another example of how these are simply tools and cannot quite be deemed a digital revolution. Going back to last week’s discussion, have anyone’s thoughts about social media’s role in revolutions changed? Can social media really be responsible for digital revolutions?

Is Social Media Helpful??

Recently, during class discussion, many people have held the belief that social media, such as YouTube and Twitter, is not an effective tool for social movements and revolutions. They have argued that these tools really do not make a difference to help further an ulterior goal; however, this is not necessarily true. Although many people may hold the belief that Twitter is essentially useless by Karpf’s description of ‘tactical measures,’ the revolutions that have occurred across the Middle East and North Africa (Tunisia, Egypt, etc.) show that it can have a real impact on mobilization.

Karpf argued that often times Twitter can be ineffective at accomplishing substantial changes and goals due to the fact that it largely relies on tactical measures. Tactical measures tally up easily countable things such as signatures, visits, blog posts, tweets, retweets, shares, etc. in order to give a very superficial estimation on one’s influence using social media (Karpf, 2010, p.151). With this view, having 1 million followers, 1 million tweets, having 1 million people retweet your tweet really does not accomplish anything. Although it may raise awareness, it is not successful at accomplishing an end goal. This seems to be a popular view about social media that isn’t completely true. Although Twitter does contain many easily countable tactical measures, that does not mean it cannot have a true impact.

The revolutions and protests that took place in the Middle East and North Africa exemplify good examples of how social media sites, similar to Twitter, actually can be successful at achieving end goals. In the article, “The Role of Digital Media,” Howard and Hussain discuss the upheavals that occurred in Tunisia and Egypt. Social media websites were used as a way to organize the masses and share information quickly, when the government was actively attempting to shut down all communication. Because these technologies were so new, the government wasn’t completely superior in their knowledge of how to censor them. For this reason, it gave the masses an edge. They could use the collective knowledge of all these people to work together to protect social media websites and communication in a way that allowed them to organize protests and share relevant pictures and videos. By actually mobilizing the masses by showing the injustice through pictures and videos, and then going further to help facilitate the meeting places of these protests, it shows that social media actually is very effective at achieving end goals.

Although some people may believe that sharing a Facebook post, changing a picture, posting a tweet or video, or having many followers is not actually effective at achieving an ulterior goal, they fail to recognize that these things actually can initiate something that is necessary in order to get that goal. For example if all of the protesters were following the same person/ receiving the same tweets, this would help them all stay informed and organize in order to facilitate a change.

Discussion Questions:
Do you think that social media is helpful during political and social upheavals? Why or why not?

Do you think the new social media application, Vine, will be helpful in future movements?  (Vine lets you record/ share 6 second  videos)

The Arab Spring: Did social media really “revolutionize” the revolution?

This weeks readings centered around the Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, with a particular focus on how social media technology played a role in this unique revolution.  In Howard’s article The Upheavals in Egypt and Tunisia: The Role of Digital Media, it is stressed that this revolution is distinct from those that came before it because of the utilization of the Internet, mobile phones and social media.  Howard stresses that these technologies allowed activists to build networks, create social capital and organize their political action.  He notes that participants weren’t necessarily moved by the technology, but rather, the technology provided “scaffolding upon which civil society can build” (48).

Anderson’s article, Demystifying the Arab Spring, takes a slightly different approach to understanding this unique revolution.  This article details how each country’s situation lent itself to revolution—Tunisia had a large generational gap between the uprising young generation and the older leadership, Egypt had an unusually high tolerance for free expression and Libya was a divided country and needed a foundation for state formation.  Anderson seems to challenge Howard by saying that these situations are not important because of social media’s ability normalize civic engagement in the three countries as one unit.  She says, rather, that these revolutions were made possible because of the ways in which each individual society’s aspirations and desires for change empowered each local group.  She seems to agree with Howard that youth sharing ideas and organizing on social media was a factor in this revolutionary movement, however, he maintains that this platform alone was not responsible for the change and that each country must be treated as a separate case.

These somewhat contradicting theories beg an important question: Aside from the existence of a social media platform, what other factors need to be in existence in order for revolution or uprising to take place?  Does the platform alone cause a change in the way these uprisings happen, or does it have to b e accompanied by a societal change as well?

The Importance of “Social Influencers”

One common thread I found most interesting, mentioned by both Tufekci & Wilson, and Howard & Hussain, was about the importance of early adopters and social influencers in the process of “igniting” a social revolution in Egypt, specifically. Both sets of authors argue that although the revolutions seemed to erupt from the use of social media, the presence of notable leaders (traditionally recognized in social uprisings) was replaced by a group of well-connected, social media savvy individuals who often remained “faceless.” I ultimately question the impact these individuals truly had through social media by pointing out that the authors seemed to dramatize how many people actually used social media during the protests and also bringing up how this small number of individuals can’t do all the work themselves.

In their survey of individuals who participated in Egypt’s Tahrir Square protests, Tufekci and Wilson found that “people learned about the protests primarily through interpersonal communication” and that “social media use greatly increased the odds that a respondent attended protests the first day” (363). Howard and Hussain argue in support of this finding, adding that the street protests were made possible, in part, by social media use and online interaction. Ultimately, the two authors are optimistic about the potential of digital media to connect groups of people with social discontent in order to organize for a political/social action.

I’ve always been interested in studying how certain individuals fall in the “adopter/influencer” scale, whether that be adopting new technology, communication tools, or social norms. What I’ve often heard is that the percentage of early adopters (whom I would argue we can compare to the first round of well-connected, online activists who demonstrated their support in the early protests of Tahrir Square) is typically small when considering the total number who could have been involved. I would argue that both authors overestimate the influence of these individuals by making it seem as if they were “all” on Twitter or Facebook sharing updates. I think it’s important for us to consider that these uprisings were encouraged by social media — but that the early social influencers could not possibly do all the work.

My question for the class is: Are the early adopters/social influencers as important as the readings make them out to be?

Arab Spring and Social Media

The Arab Spring gave way for revolution in the Middle East for countries like Egypt and Tunisia. The revolution of social media has sparked a new information gateway for people all over the world, making it easier for people to find relevant information on crucial issues in order to take consequential action. Mobile phones were the first step in organizing revolution, as citizens would “call their social networks into the streets” (Hussain, 38-39). Then, political activists would organize civil disobedience through social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter, which was a way of social organizing as a gateway into communicating plans of uprising and protest (Hussain, 39). In this way, social networking has a positive influence in the Arab Spring in that it creates a forum for citizens to communicate plans of civil uprising against authoritarian governments that are oppressive.

In a study conducted by Tufekci and Wilson (2012), they found that social media, especially Facebook and Twitter SNS, played a key role in the protests that preceded the resignation of Mubarak. Protesters were able to gain information first and foremost from Facebook, and then furthermore, was a platform for posting videos and pictures (Tufekci, 374). It was also found that people who used Facebook and Twitter were more likely to participate in the protests than people who relied on telephone and e-mail (Tufekci, 375).

This goes against what we’ve been discussing in class in terms of “slack-tivism” in that these articles support the usage of social networking sites as a way to get involved and start political revolution as a means of obtaining democracy in authoritarian countries.

If you were living in a country like Egypt circa 2010, where would you go first to get information regarding Mubarak? In obtaining this information, would you be willing to participate in protests that could lead to government brutality?

Social Media Revolutions

            I have been an avid fan of social media for some time now.  I have used it for escapism, promote events, and create networks.  This small-scale usage of social media sites is nothing compared to the role of digital media in the Middle East and North Africa.  SNS organized action, made differences in countries as a whole, and allowed social movements to reach once-unachievable goals.  In the readings, “The Role of Digital Media” by Howard and Hussein and “Social Media and the Decision to Participate in Political Protest:  Observations from Tahrir Square” by Tufeki and Wilson discuss the democratic upheavals in the Arab world through social media and political protest. 

            The Arab world was in need for a political change.  The match that lit this fire was organized through the use of social media such as Facebook and Twitter, the Internet, and mobile devices.  This technology allowed citizens interested in democracy to build extensive networks, create social capital and organize political action with a speed and scale never seen before (36).  Both Tunisia and Egypt have had a large and active online public sphere that was frequently banned by political parties and disaffected citizens.  After digital media spread the success against those in political power, authorities in Algeria, Bahrain, Libya, Saudi Arabic and Syria tried to engage in digital conversation to bring upon political change (39).  This led to arrests, beatings, and many more.  Soon after, there were PDF tip sheets circulating around to show how to pull of a successful protest.  This togetherness had great impacts on civic engagement and proved that awareness of social media can produce great change.   

            Tufeki and Wilson discuss the emergence of new systems of political communications and social medias role in the political protests in Egypt. They found that social media use increased the odds that a respondent attended protests (363).   Both Facebook and Twitter contributed to the findings of the corruption that was taking place in these countries.  This shared awareness and knowledge reinforces Howard and Hussein’s claims, and this study shows that citizens act accordingly with what is portrayed throughout social media.   

            Do you think that the ways people in these countries used social media to create this revolution could be used the same in the US? What contributing factors do citizens need in order to act upon knowledge they obtain? 

Is Social Media More Useful Than We Think?

Throughout the course, I must say I’ve been rather skeptical of the ability that social networking sites and social media in general have to actually cause action to happen and organize people into fighting for a cause. I think, for the most part, a lot of social media websites like Facebook and Twitter are great for spreading information, but are incredibly lacking when it comes to getting people to do more than be aware of a cause or injustice. However, after reading the Howard and Hussain piece, my skeptical (or even pessimistic) ways of thinking about social media were slightly changed, as they demonstrated that some form, even a little bit, of action could be ignited through organized social media. In the essay, specifically the part about Tunisia, Howard and Hussain suggest that accusations of the corruption of government “had come from the blogosphere” (36). Now, that really isn’t anything new. Social media, I agree, is great for making people aware and giving the general public a voice. But, because of this general awareness and the fact that “investigative journalism was almost solely the work of average citizens using the Internet in creative ways,” action and civil engagement was actually a result (36). Because of Mohamed Bouazizi’s civic act of lighting himself on fire in protest of the corrupt government and the public’s realization of this corruption as they “watched YouTube videos about the abusive state,” “Ben Ali’s critics moved from virtual to actual public spaces” (36). This idea, then, proves that awareness on social media sites really can entice civic action.

             Similarly, in the more quantitative study of this same idea run by Tufekci and Wilson, this idea is reinforced as they show that “social media use greatly increased the odds that a respondent attended protests” (363). The study reveals that Facebook use and the increased use of other social media sites exposed “poverty, corruption, and human rights abuses, including torture” (364). Again, like the Howard and Hussain piece revealed, the sheer awareness spread by these sites, however, really isn’t in question. It is the use of the awareness. Do the people actually take their knowledge and act? The results of this study suggest that they, for the most part, do. Specifically, to provide an example, the researchers found that “the early participants in the Tahrir Square demonstrations tended to rely on blogs, Twitter, Facebook, phones, and E-mail for information about the protests” (373). Just this simple finding, I think, reveals a lot about the capabilities of social media to entice people into action. While I definitely think it is difficult to cause larger-scaled action only through social media (which this study shows is true, as it suggests that personal and face-to-face communication is a big factor in protest attendance), it definitely shows that social media can be significantly useful in situations like this. 

             So my questions for you: Did reading these articles change your mind at all about the capabilities social media sites have in enticing people to act? Are you willing to think of Facebook and Twitter as more than mediums for escapism and assign them some political power?

Week Twelve Response: The positives and negatives of Twitter in the Iranian revolution

Since I tend to take a more pessimistic approach to social media I found the Gladwell and Morozov readings to be the most substantive of the four readings we had for this week. Both Gladwell and Morozov downplay the role of Twitter in the attempted revolution in Iran in 2009.  Gladwell compares the revolution to the sit in movement of 1960, explaining that the strong ties and hierarchical structure necessary for such a movement to succeed are just not achievable in the world of social media. Morozov too criticizes Twitter for its circuitous flow of information and its inability to deceive a government with even the smallest amount of knowledge about the Internet. I agree with both authors, and I would also add that in some cases Twitter may hurt more than it helps.

Malcolm Gladwell writes that “weak ties seldom lead to high-risk activism.” This simple statement is a neat summation of the greatest problem facing activism on social media sites, which is that spreading awareness does not necessarily lead to further actions. Social media simply gives people an easier way to think that they have done something. And even if someone were to try to organize a substantial movement on a site like Twitter, it would most likely fail because Twitter supports the spread of a network, not the tiered structure of a hierarchy. And in Gladwell’s estimation, without the discipline and strategy provided by a hierarchy, a high-risk movement like the one in Iran cannot be successful.

Likewise, Evgeny Morozov points to social media’s reliance on second-hand or third-hand information, likening the path of communication to a giant game of telephone. Information going from a Farsi speaking Iranian’s blog through a translator to an English speaking American’s blog has a high chance of becoming garbled or otherwise manipulated along the way. And Morozov goes on to say that a Twitter revolution is only really possible under a government that is ignorant of the Internet. 

Which brings me to my next point, which is that social media sites actually make it easier for governments to track down dissenters and could potentially even allow them to stifle protests before they happen. Morozov also writes about a group of hackers that attacked some of the Iranian government’s websites, only to find that they had actually succeeded in slowing down the entire Iranian Internet. These two instances are examples of the negative effects of social media usage in these revolutions. So my question to the class is this: do you think that the positive effects of social media are enough to overcome the negative effects? 

Can Slacktivism Be Changed?

The question of these readings are, can uprisings be attributed to social media? While new media is substantive for change, and without it and new information through technology there would be no change at all, it cannot create a serious uprising in the modern world. Anything on these social media networks can be seen by the government, whom have the opportunity to weed out information they want the public to see, and that which they don’t, as Morozov talks about.

Gladwell talks about weak tie connections versus strong tie connections, referring to sit in movements. While week tie connections are all that’s needed to attempt to create an uprising or protest, they usually don’t have any sort of real change or outcome. Howard talks about the tweeting to Iran from Australia. The issue is, these Australian have not actually having an impact on these people, they are actually  putting them in more harm. This week tie connection is not substantive activism. Morozov points out that there isn’t much of a difference between pre-social media protests and their results as post-social media protests and their results. This is due to what Morozov refers to as, slacktivism. Someone feels that they’re making a contribution to a cause by using social media, yet they’re making no real impact. Therefore, the question that these readings asked is answered- an uprising cannot be attributed to social media.

My question for this reading is this- Are there adjustments to our social media- Twitter, Facebook, ect- or a new type of social media, that could reduce slacktivism and increase the impact we have on a certain issue or event?

Modern Activism: Powered by Tools or Causes?

In this week’s readings, we are presented with somewhat conflicting ideas about the power that social media plays within contemporary Muslim media systems, using the Iranian protests and revolution in particular. The most important message that rings true throughout the different arguments is the idea that the potential  that a mass communication system like Twitter has versus its actual mobilizing effects. I agree with Gladwell that the ability to mobilize people to act within social causes goes past the actual tools used within the revolution, but rather the causes and real connections between people that actually creates change. In addition, Morozov adds a layer to debunking the power of Twitter by pointing out the Westernized cultural lens by which we measure the “success” of the revolution.

The New Yorker article by Malcolm Gladwell argues quite simply that “social media cannot provide what social change always required” even though we are told that we are in the midst of a new media revolution. Gladwell simply spells out the idealized version of new media’s potential that “Facebook and Twitter and the like– will allow the powerless to collaborate, coordinate, and give voice to their concerns.” However, he debunks this idea by explaining that activism comes primarily from social connection, and Facebook and Twitter create weak connections– too weak to motivate people into real action. This is an intersection point where potential meets reality- the potential of influence between friends and the actual motivation power of “Facebook friends”.

The idealized version of the “Twitter Revolution” was similarly blown up by the Westernized definition. So much of how we interpret the Iranian revolution is clouded by our lens as American citizens and our potential to overestimate the power of social media within social change efforts. However, Morozov brings to question the cultural applicability of twitter in a non-western context. “we are quick to make the connection between the fact that there are thousands of people marching or demonstrating in the streets and the fact that these young peoples’ Twitter updates are read by thousands(most of whom live outside of Iran). But this connection is imaginary. To ascribe such great importance to Twitter is to disregard the fact that it is very poorly suited to planning protests in a repressive environment like Iran’s.” We, as Americans, tend to oversimplify causes and take recognition for causing social change. For example, Morozov brings up the idea that well-meaning yet naive Americans connecting with Iranians through twitter only causes more harm for the Iranians but creates a sense of ownership in the solution among American people.

Hypothetically, do you think that if a software engineer created a new media program or application relevant to Iranian politics and communications that allowed people to connect with one another and organize themselves within the country, it would provoke more successful revolution? Do you think that wireless communication is the answer at all, or is giving it so much power actually detracting from its usefulness?

Can one tweet make a difference?

Can one tweet make a difference?

This weeks readings examined the innerworkings of how tweets and other “new media” sites are contributing to protests, uprisings and even further influencing political changes. These protests utilizing social media platforms are quite different than the old school protests with signs, picketing and rioting that most are used to; which has led the authors of our readings and surely many other people to question their actual effectiveness. As realized by our previous readings social media sites are obviously conducive to mobilization and spreading information quickly, but are they enough to protest over heavily serious issues, like the elections in Iran or the uprisings in Egypt?

Gladwell says that the answer to this question is no. That twitter can not recreate or conjure up support anywhere near what’s needed for a real revolution. In comparison to the Civil Rights movement, which relied heavily on in person meetings, things like sit-ins and multi-faceted community involvement, Gladwell states that the support on twitter is too weak. He says that having strong network ties, is an essential component to social movements and protest and that twitter doesn’t foster such ties at all.  Gladwell also makes a point to emphasize the importance of a leadership hierarchy when organizing such movements. A central leader and follower dynamic is important, and the way that twitter is set up makes it such that anyone with a significant amount of “followers” can be a leader or spread information without actually having any relevant authority. Having multiple leaders, can be a big detriment to strategic aspects of movements and revolutions which he also points out.

Morozov also shares some of the same ideals centered around the point that these twitter and blogging revolutions aren’t as effective as we may think and are often accompanied by a significant backlash- in particular the one in Iran.  The point that I thought was most convincing focused on how those on twitter who want to be involved in the revolution, have interest levels across a spectrum- from those who are slactivists, and those who have high personal stakes in the cause. For this reason it’s incredibly difficult to (1) motivate everyone through a single message and (2) unify people in such a way that they want to take action and move the “revolution” offline.

From these I thought of two questions:

If you were going to start a revolution which social media platform (or combination of them) would you choose? Why?

Because both of these readings are quite critical of the twitter revolutions, what are some of the positives to a revolution like this? How is it ‘better’ than pre-twitter revolutions? Is it better?

Protests Aren’t Flashmobs

Analyzing the Morozov and Howard reading, we can reach two general conclusions: Without the internet, the ‘collectiveness’ of ‘collective action’ would be jeopardized, and the internet only supplements the awareness of protests, not begins them.   

Examining the protests in Iran, we can see that these activists used different outlets to report what is going on when the government ‘shut off’ many outlets of communication.  The voting was jammed on different databases and Iran was essentially ‘off the global grid’.  Thanks to the social media outlet, which allows for only 140 characters or less in each message, the U.S. and many other international regions aside from Iran were able to follow with the everyday activity of these movements.  For example, the martyrdom of Neda Agha Soltan and her public death went viral because of social media.  The social media avenues used by civilians during these protests sustained them beyond what was foreseen by their government.  

Though we see social media as a sustainability factor for large movements and protests such as the one in Iran, how much can we attribute internet usage to the protests itself? 

As Howard sates, ‘protests are not flashmobs’.  Flashmobs, entertaining ‘movements’ involving a mass of people all dancing in a synchronized fashion during a premeditated time and location, can not be compared to an anti-governmental protest. He also writes that technology alone doesn’t cause political change, but it imposes constraints and generates new capacities for the movement e.g. awareness and information.  

He touches on Andrew Sullivan’s theories and critiques that Twitter leaves room for bias and can often times be misleading.  While Twitter is a commonly used outlet for news, we must remember that it does indeed only allow 140 characters or less, leaving room for much miscommunication or biased information.  

 The takeaways from Howards article are simple.  Twitter cannot foster the planning of protests nor will it begin one solely through the features it has- they only inform active followers.  

 Much of the use of Twitter is generated by slacktivism, which does not equal an overthrow of the government.  Governments and activists should learn the ropes of Twitter and the potential it holds to inform and spread awareness about protests, but it does not cause or start protests.  

 

With that, I invite you to reflect on how much you rely on Twitter for news and ask yourself, does it hold enough credibility to inform you on what is factual versus biased? Does it cover the entire story?

 And lastly, would you consider your Twitter usage slacktivism or have you readily ‘joined’ a movement you saw being promoted on Twitter?

The Overemphasis of Social Media

Over centuries, the way that activists have formed protests has changed and adapted to the technologies of the time. In this century, Twitter has been thought of as a key element to organizing and aiding the determined people of certain cultures to make change. However, the opinions of how successful Twitter is at leading a revolution varies, and individuals such as Morozov and Gladwell believe that although a powerful tool, platforms such as Twitter and Facebook may be overrated in causing such political activism. 

Morozov is quite critical of calling the uprising in Iran the “Twitter Revolution” for many reasons. He does believe that twitter has given us access to the thought process of young citizens “in real time” of countries for the first time, but does it really represent the entire population of the country? Morozov argues no, because the Twitter users are quite often those who are “mostly pro-Western, technology friendly, Ipod- carrying young people” (Morozov, 12). Furthermore, just like the game of telephone, information gets translated and transferred incorrectly, but the information gets processed to the public anyway because of the lack of “traditional media.”

Gladwell argues a similar claim; people have forgotten what true activism looks like, all because of the “outsized enthusiasm for social media” (Gladwell, 3). He claims that unlike revolutions in previous times, activism associated with social media is built around weak ties. Although weak ties are important in obtaining new ideas and information, it almost never leads to high-risk activism. “Social networks are effective at increasing participation- by lessening the level of motivation that participation requires” (Gladwell, 6). Because of this, social media does not lead to the types of revolutions that occurred before the rampage of the Internet; when individuals think they are making a change they are really not doing much.

With these arguments, it is clear that social media is a powerful tool and a great resource, but not the leading cause of activism in various countries. While it encourages people to get involved, they would need to step out from behind the computer screen to full get involved and cause change. If Twitter had existed back in the day of Martin Luther King or any other movements that had great success, would they be as successful and productive? What would change? 

Weak Tweets

The message in these readings is that social media sites are not capable of creating revolution, which seems somewhat kind of obvious after reading them. Anything put up on Twitter or Facebook can be found by the government. It does not make much sense to plan a protest via tweeting because the government can find those tweets, stop the protest, and punish those directly involved as Morozov suggests. Social networking sites also breed slacktivism, as we have previously discussed. They work by using weak ties to get people “involved”. As Gladwell states, they are great for increasing participation, not activism. It takes no effort to get a few hundred thousand people to like a Facebook page, but it takes quite a bit to get even thousands to march in protest. Gladwell says that high-risk activism is a strong tie activity. This is so because it takes courage to take a high-risk and people need the support of others they know well and trust. Twitter and Facebook do not create strong tie networks. They are all about maximizing weak ties.

Another issue more specific to social media use in Iran, is that a majority of us do not understand Iranian culture well enough to be able to accurately decipher a message. According to Morozov, it’s like a game of “telephone”. As the message travels from blogger to blogger, it gets contorted and the meaning changes. Since American journalists are banned from Iran, they rely on these blogs for their information. Another issue with this is that a the people who use Twitter in Iran are a small and extremely untypical group. However, Howard indicates that social media sites are not totally useless and counterproductive. Although they do not directly lead to social revolution, he argues that they are necessary for it to happen in the Middle East and also serve to prolong it once the revolution has started. This slightly different viewpoint brings up the question that I am asking you guys which is: contrary to what the other readings have told us, do you think it will ever be possible to have a social revolution through social media? For this question assume the group in power has a virtual presence and is aware of the power of the Internet.

Social Media: All Its Cracked Up To Be?

In the academic research on social movements there are many differing opinions on how effective social media websites such as Twitter are at mobilizing people and creating revolutions for change. Some feel that social media sites excel at bringing people from all over the world together to fight for a common cause. They believe that through social media websites people are able to form connections which span the globe, which would be otherwise unobtainable without the use of the Internet. Some believe, however, that social media websites don’t play a large role in the mobilization of people for revolutions, and that the mainstream media overplays their roles, such as in the “Twitter Revolution” in Iran. In the readings for this week, both Morozov and Gladwell go into detail on why social media may not be all its cracked up to me in regards to mobilizing citizens for revolutions.

In Morozov’s Iran: The Downside to the “Twitter Revolution”, he describes how the value of Twitter was very overplayed in the revolution in Iran in 2009. In the article, Morozov proclaims that Twitter is very much like a game of “telephone,” where the message may start out as clear and unified but may end up completely different in meaning from the original. He criticizes the the amount of context which can be put into a tweet, as it is limited to only 140 characters. He goes on to state that those who are using Twitter in Iran (which is a very small number), are a very untypical segment of the population, who are mostly pro-Western, technology friendly, and young. (Pg. 12) These are the people who are providing information, yet whatever they share on Twitter may have little relevancy to the rest of Iran. So not only may the messages may be getting filled with errors and changed as they are spread via Twitter, they may not even be relevant to begin with.

In Gladwell’s Small Change: Why The Revolution Won’t be Televised, he also sheds light on the ineffectiveness of social media sites as the sole tool for forming revolutions. In the article Gladwell states that platforms of social media, such as Twitter, are built around forming weak ties, as opposed to the strong bonds necessary for high-risk activism. The weak ties formed thought social media platforms encourage people to participate, but to participate in ways which they don’t have to make any real type of sacrifice. Without making any type of sacrifice the only thing gained out of the participation is social acknowledgment and praise, no real action for substantial change. Gladwell also points out that successful revolutions have a hierarchical organizational structure, one with rules and a central authority figure who makes decisions. But social media sites such as Twitter foster networks, which lack a centralized structure and result in decisions being made by the collective group of people whom are connected through weak ties. These network structures often fail at reaching a consensus on decisions and setting goals, as they lack a real leader, which limits their ability to think strategically. In order to form a successful revolution against a strong established group the need to think strategically is vital.

So while social media platforms may be a great way to connect people with similar beliefs from all over the world, they alone cannot form a successful revolution. The key to a successful revolution includes a hierarchical organization of participants with strong ties and the creation of a unified message, which social media is unable to provide. My questions for the class are, do you think that it is possible to form a successful revolution in today’s day and age without the use of social media, using strictly traditional tactics such as those used in the Civil Rights Movements of the 60’s? And what do you think is in store for the future of social media activism?